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CORTEZ
1.

Timely

Federal/Criminal
SUN~ffiRY:

The SG challenges the CA 9's

~tan~ards

for judging the

legality of vehicle stops by Border Patrol officers.
2.

FACTS:

Following jury trials, resps were convicted of trans-

porting illegal aliens in vioJ.ation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1324

(a) (2).

Resps

filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to an allegedly
illegal stop by Dorder Patrol officers.
suppression hearing
._;

establishe~

The evidence at the pre-trial

that early in December 1976, Border

Patrol officers patrolling a sparcely popula teo area of the f1ex ican

border near Sells, Arizona, began investigating footprint patterns sug7k; WtU 4.A Cit~~~
,~ eoe'~* :r ~ ~
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(

gesting

illegal immigration.

Footprints indicated that on a number of

occasions groups of from 8 to 20 persons had walked north from the
Mexican border across 30 miles of desert and mountains to an isolated
area on Highway 86, an east-west highway in Arizona.
print was of a

distinctive chevron design.

One recurring shoe

The officers knew that the

area through which the groups passed was heavily used by aliens illegally
entering the country, and they concluded that a person (whom they
referred to as ''Chevron'') was guiding groups of aliens across the border
and north to a place on Highway 86 where they would be piclted up by a
vehicle.
Investigation led the officers to a number of additional conclusions.

They had reason to believe that the groups travelled at night,

during clear weather, and on or near weekends.

In addition, the tracks

around Highway 86 indicated that the aliens, when they reached the highway, would walk parallel to the road for several miles in an eastward
direction, and then turn directly north to the highway and disappear.
From this the officers concluded that the groups were probably picked up
by a vehicle that approached them from the east, since it was unlikely
that the aliens, after a long overland march, would walk along the highway away from the vehicle that was corning to meet them.

They also in-

ferred that the vehicle probably returned to the east since it was unlikely that the aliens w6uld be walking away from their ultimate destination.
Armed with this information, two officers who had been involved in
the Chevron tracks investigation devised criteria for

identifyi~g

vehicle which might be transporting Chevron and illegal aliens.

a
On the

evening of January 30, 1977, the two officers decided to station themselves just off Highway 86 approximately 30 miles east of the area where

-

(

3 -

the Chevron-led groups had been picked up.

The officers had no d irect

information suggesting that Chevron would be leading a group that
evening.

Nonetheless, the officers believed it might be a likely ·time

since it was a Sunday and the first clear night after a
of rain.

The officers estimated that if Chevron did

three-~ay

lea~

period

a group that

night, they would probably be picked up between 2:00 and 6:00 a.m. on
January 31, in accordance 0ith the officers' estimate of the travelling

I

time.

The officers decided to watch particularly for a camper, van, or

similar vehicle that was capable of concealing a fairly large group.

The

officers therefore determined that they would stop any camper or similar
vehicle that passed the officers in a westward direction, in the early
morning hours of January 31, and which returned eastward approximately

(

one and one half hours later.
Two of the 20 vehicles which passed the Border Patrol officers that
morning were pick-up trucks with camper shells.

The first camper pass e d

them at 4:30 a.m. travelling in a westward direction, and passed them a
second time, travelling in an eastward direction at 6:12 a.m.

Since the

vehicle fit the profile formulated by the officers, they stopped the
camper.

The officers identified themselves and told the driver that they

were conducting an immigration check.
was anyone in the camper.

Cortez stated that he had picked up some

hitchhikers and proceeded to open the back of the camper.

The officers

established that the six persons in the back were aliens.

The passenger

/fiJ! in

c-

They asked resp Cortez if there

the front seat \vore the tell-tale Chevron shoes.
3.

DECISIONS BELOW:

The DC denied the motion to suppress.

The CA

reversed, holding that the officers lacked reasonable cuspicion justifying the stop of the camper.
~rignoni-:-?once,

422

u.s.

The CA reasoned that United States v.

---------

873 (1975) established that probetb l e cause to

::

- 4 -

c

stop the vehicle was not constitutionally required.
suspicion" was all that Has necessary.

Rather, a ''founded

A founded suspicion could not,

however, be based merely on a profile, in the judgment of the CA.

The

stop was not grounded on a founded suspicion because it was "solely a
product of a profile, not of facts associated with the
behavior, or the specific appearance of his vehicle.

indivi~ual,

his

Officers did not

sec anything suspicious about the vehicle itself, nor did they have
specific information about illegal movement of aliens in the area that
night.

The court concluded, therefore, that the circumstances ''furnished

far too many innocent inferences to make the officers' suspicions
reasonably warranted."
Judge Chambers dissented.

The dissent concluded that in the facts of

this case, the suspicion which was based on skillful police analysis, was
not "unfounded" under Brignoni-Ponce.
4.

CONTENTIONS:

The SG argues that the decision of the CA essen-

tially precludes law enforcement officers from formulating a "founded
suspicion" on the basis of merely circumstantial evidence.

The SG states

that this distinction in the nature of evidence necessary to support a
suspicion is contrary to this Court's cases.

In - Brignoni-Ponce, the

Court recognized that numerous circumstantial factors could he taken into
account in deciding whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop a car
in the border area.

The court specifically approved consideration of

proximity to the border, usual traffic p a tterns on a road, previous experience with alien traffic, information about recent illegal border
crossings, the driver's behavior, and the suitability of the vehicle for
transporting concealed aliens.

422 U.S. at 884-885.

these factors indicate the legality of the stop.
sion of the CA.

The SG ar0ues that

Resps rely on the deci-

~

-5-

c

5.

DISCUSSION:

The decision of the CA is questionable under the

standards articulated by this Court in Brignoni-Ponce itself.

Further-

more, the Court has recently suggested that stops undertaken in accordance with neutral law enforcement criteria may presumably be valid.
Bro\;n v. Texas, 47 USLW 4810, 4811 (June 25, 1979).

See

Granting cert may

not be necessary since the Court may address the validity of profile
stops in United States v. r1endcnhall, 78-1821 (cert granted Oct. 1,
1979).

In Mendenhall, an airline passenger was stopped for questioning

in an airport by Drug Enforcement Administration agents on the basis of a
drug courier profile.

The facts supporting the profile in

Oen~enhall

were far less indicative of the likelihood of criminal behavior than the
profile utilized by the law enforcement officers in this case.

(

There-

fore, if the Court in Mendenhall holds that the drug courier profile supported a reasonable suspicion justifying the stop, it would appear appropriate to GVR in light of rtendenhall.

I would recommend a hold for

Mendenhall.
Response filed.
10/22/79
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States v. Cortez. The question in this

case is whether two border agents reasonably suspected that the
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vehicle driven by the respondent contained illegal aliens,
which it did. The agents' suspicions rested on circumstantial
evidence suggesting that illegal aliens were being transported
to the interior by a truck or camper from an isolated point
along a highway, 25 miles north of the Mexican border. From
footprints in the desert sand, the agents concluded that the
aliens came over the border by foot at night and were met by a
vehicle travelling from the east, and which was assumed to
return in the same direction. Calculating the timing of the

~~

march and the rendezvous, on a night following several nights

~·

~~~)

of inclement weather, the agents stopped the one vehicle that
fit their inferences. The district court denied the
suppress, but a divided Court of Appeals reversed

moti~-

(CA9; Hug,

Ferguson; Chambers, diss'g), concluding that there were no
facts focusing suspicion on the respondent's vehicle, and that
there were "far too many innocent inferences to make the
officers' suspicions reasonably warranted." Although the
question is for me a close one, I do not think that the
elaborate inferences on which the agents acted in this case are
typical, and thus that plenary review would be useful. Since
the case is als@
deny certiorari.

verned by Mendenhall, I shall vote to

I
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:
From:

Mr. Justice Powell

November 21, 1980

Paul Smith

No. 79-404:

United States v. Cortez

Question Presented
Whether

it

was

constitutional,

under

the

Fourth

Amendment, for two border agents to stop petitioners' vehicle,
based

on

activity.

the

grounds

they

then had

for

suspecting criminal

2.

Background
Petitioners were arrested after being stopped while
driving

in

aliens.

camper

truck

that

also

contained

six

illegal

Petitioner Hernandez wore shoes with a distinctive,

---

"Chevron"
while

a

tread.

border

Tracks

agents

with

were

this

tracking

tread
at

had

been

observed

least

four

separate

trails from the Mexican border up to Highway 86,
stop took place.

where this

These trails showed that a pers_£n wearing

the Chevron shoes had repeatedly been part of groups of people
hiking the 25 miles from the border to the highway--at night
and without rests.
previously

In addition, captured illegal aliens had

identified

their

guide

as

a

man

wearing

these

shoes.
The
occasions.

On

track

was

that

four

trails

Tuesday
"a

were

January

day

or

approximately a week old.

two

actually
4,

Agent

old,"

tracked
Gray

and

on

two

followed

one

another

that

was

On Sunday January 16, Agents Gray

and Rayburn saw one set of tracks that was from the previous
night,
old.

and another

set

that was

perhaps

three or

four

days

The tracks turned east when they reached Highway 86, an

east-west

road,

and

paralleled

the

roadway

for

four

miles

until they reached Milepost 122, where they disappeared into
the roadway.
Based

on

these

facts,

Agents

Gray

and

Evans

suspected that "Chevron" tended to take groups over the border
on weekend nights, leaving in early evening so as to arrive at

3.

Highway

86

before

dawn.

They

were

particularly

suspicious

about the night of Sunday, January 30, because it was preceded
by

several

days

difficult.

of

rain

that

would

have

made

such

a

hike

During the early morning hours of January 31, they

were posted at Milepost 149, 27 miles east of Chevron's normal
pick-up point, where they could watch traffic coming up a side
road from the south, as well as traffic on Highway 86 itself.
They

felt

that

the vehicle meeting

the

group woud

probably

come from the east, because the previous groups had headed in
that direction when they reached the highway.
e~ ce,

they

articularly

vehicles that could carry groups.

Based on their

suspicious

of

large

They also calculated

the

time at which a rendezvous would be expected, and the amount
of time required to pass them by heading westward, pick up a
group, and return to their location.
Petitioners' was one of two campers that passed the
officers heading west.
later,

just about as

camper,

and

driver

seat.

It returned one hour and forty minutes
they had calculated.

petitioner
They

Cortez

observed

got

out

someone

They stopped the

immediately

move

a

from

curtain

the

in

the

rear, and asked Cortez whether there were people inside.

He

stated that he had picked up some hitchhikers, and opened the
rear door without being asked to do so. 1

The six undocumented

lpetitioners dispute this version of how the camper door was
opened.
The Court is, however, probably bound to accept the

4.

aliens were inside.

Petitioner Hernandez was in the passenger

seat.

Discussion
This case presents a single, distinct issue--whether
the

facts

known

"reasonable

to

suspicion,"

for

officers

some

Ohio,

limited

were

sufficient

justifying their

The

course, vT erry v.
that

the

seminal
392 U.S.

seizures

may

case
1

stop of

in

(1968),

be

this

to

create

the camper

area

is,

of

which established

justified

by

less

than

probable cause.
More recently,
422

u.s.

873

./'

in United States v.

Br ignoni-Ponce,

(1975), your opinion for the Court discussed the

application of Terry to the context of vehicle stops near the
Mexican border.
solely

on

the

You held
Mexican

that random stops, or stops based
appearance

of

a

driver,

were

government's version, since the motion to suppress was denied
in the district court and the CA9 's ruling was a legal one,
that did not dispute any factual conclusions the district
court could have reached. Unfortunately, the record (at least
the printed materials) does not contain findings by the
district court.
2There can be 'no question, on these facts, about whether
there was a "seizure" here, for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Moreover, it is
clear that the seizure was a minimal stop for questioning, not
a full search requiring probable cause.
Cortez opened the
camper voluntarily.
And the fact that the officers may have
intended to conduct a full search is irrelevant.

5.

unconstitutional,

but elaborated on the various factors that

may create reasonable suspicion:3
Officers may consider the characteristics of the
area
in which they encounter a vehicle.
Its
proximity to the border, the usual patterns of
traffic
on
the
particular
road,
and
previous
experience with alien traffic are all relevant.
They also may consider information about recent
illegal border crossing in the area.
The driver's
behavior may be relevant, as erratic driving or
obvious attempts to evade officers can support a
reasonable suspicion.
Aspects of the vehicle
itself may justify suspicion. For example, officers
say
that
certain
station
wagons,
with
large
compartments for fold-down seats or spare tires, are
frequently used for transporting concealed aliens.
The vehicle may appear to be heavily loaded, it
may have an extraordinary number of passengers, or
the officers may observe persons trying to hide . . . .
The Government also points out that trained officers
can recognize the characteristic appearance
of
persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors
as the mode of dress and haircut.
In all
situations the officer is entitled to assess the
facts in light of his experience in detecting
illegal entry and smuggling.
Id. at 884-85 (citations omitted).
This list of factors suggests that the overall set
of

circumstances

reasonable

in

this

suspicion.

Any

case
single

was

sufficient

factor

might

to
have

create
had

an

-------------~

innocent explanation, but in combination they created grounds

3see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 u.s. 543
(1976)
(short stops for questioning are permissible at a
permanent checkpoint even
in the absence of reasonable
suspicion);
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975)
(searches without probable cause not permissible even at a
checkpoint) .

~

6.

for

a

stop.

Even

then,

of course,

the officers might have

stopped an innocent party, but the Fourth Amendment does not
require

certainty

in

this

context.

In

sum,

this

case

is

relatively easy, since there were substantial grounds for the
----......,...;

officers' suspicions.
To begin with, as Brignoni-Ponce anticipated, there
were

several character is tics of

the camper

itself that were

suspicious:
The Nature

of

the Vehicle--This camper was

carry a group of aliens.

large enough

to

Few of the vehicles that passed by

that night were this large.

Although the officers testified

that their suspicions were not aroused by two "linen trucks,"
that

judgment

seems

reasonable.

In

addition,

petitioners

point out that the officers did not take notice of any station
wagons

that

may

have

passed

contain up to eight persons.

by,

even

though

these

might

But this may be explained by the

fact that officers knew that Chevron generally had brought in
groups larger than that.
The Location of

the Vehicle:

This camper was driving

in a

relatively isolated desert area near the border late at night.
The Activities of the Vehicle:

The camper headed west on the

highway and returned east, suggesting that it had completed an
errand in this relatively desolate area.
In addition, as the SG points out, the officers had
good

cause

question.

to

be

especially

suspicious

on

the

night

in

At least three of the previous four hikes involving

7.

Chevron seemed to have taken place on weekends.

This was a

clear Sunday night preceded by three days of rain.
since

the

hikers

had

always

turned

east

in

the

Moreover,
past

after

reaching Highway 86, there was at least some reason to believe
that

they

were

meeting

a

vehicle

coming

from

the

east.

Finally, the amount of time between the first sighting of the
camper and its return heading the opposite direction was one
hour and forty minutes.

The camper was driving about 50 miles

per hour and had to cover 27 miles, find the group, load them
up, and return 27 more miles.

It was quite reasonable for the

officers to estimate that this process would

take about one

and a half hours.
Based on these facts, your opinion in United States
v.

Mendenhall,

reasonable

48

U.S.L.W.

suspicion.

It

4575
is

(1980),

requires

obviously

a

important

government to stop the smuggling of illegal aliens

finding
for

the

(although

this interest is arguably less important than the stopping of
drug trafficking), and these officers were making use of their
special

expertise

in

tracking

smugglers.

This

case

distinguishable from Reid v. Georgia, 48 U.S.L.W. 3847
(per

curiam

summary

reversal),

where

based on almost no suspicious factors.
had

been

stopped

because

they

had

the

airport

is

(1980)

stop

was

There, the petitioners
taken

an

early

morning

flight from Fort Lauderdale, carried only shoulder bags, and
had

occasionally

separately.

Id.

looked
at

at

each

3847-48.

The

other
Court

while

walking

emphasized

that

8.

evidence

this minimal could

random stops.

subject

travellers

to virtually

In my view, however, the present case presents

no such danger.

The factors leading to this stop pointed to

petitioners' camper with great particularity.

Summary
The officers who made this stop had good reason to
suspect that petitioners would be bringing in a group on the
night

in

vehicle
early

question.

meeting

the

had

group would

come

from

be

suspicious

one

the

and

that

east

the

in

the

They

to

about

believe

between the time it first passed them until its return.
reason

taking

to

hours

had

hours,

reason

one-half

also

morning

They

about

a

camper

vehicle

following such a route in this desolate area late at night.
Based on the above,
existed,

I would hold that "reasonable suspicion"

justifying the limited stop.

Any other holding,

it

seems to me, would tend to eliminate the distinction between
reasonable suspicion and actual probable cause.

79-404 U.S. v. CORTEZ

Argued 12/1/80
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United States, Petitioner,

On Writ of Certiorari to theUnited States Court of Appeals ·
for the Ninth Circuit.
Jesus E. Cortez and Pedro
Hernandez-Loera.

v.

[January -. 1981]
CHIEF JusTICE BuRGEH delivered the opinion of the Court ..
We granted certiorari to consider whether objective facts
and circumstantial evidence suggesti11g that a particular
v0hicle is involved in criminal activity may provide a sufficient basis to justify an investigative stop of that vehicle.
I

Late in 1976, Border Patrol officers patrolling a sparsely
populated section of southern central Arizona found human
footprints in the desert. In time. other sets of similar footprints were discovered in the same area. From these sets
of footprints, it was deduced that, on a number of occasions.
groups of from 8 to 20 persons had walked north from the
Mexican border. across 30 miles of desert and mountains.
over a fairly well-defined path. to an isolated point on Highway 86. an cast-west road running roughly parallel to the
Mexican border.
Officers observed that one recurring shoeprint bore a distinctive repetitive V-shape, or chevron. design. Because the
officers knew from recorded experience that the area through
which the groups passed was heavily trafficked by aliens illegally entering the country from Mexico. they surmised that a
person, whom they gave the case-name "Chevron." was guiding aliens illegally into tho United States over the path
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marked by the tracks to a point "·here they could be picked
up by a vehicle.
The tracks led into or over obstacles that would have been
avoided in daylight. From this, the officers deduced that
"Chevron" probably led his groups across the border and to
the pick-up point at night. Moreover, based upon the times
when they had discovered the distinctive sets of tracks, they
concluded that "Chevron" generally travelled during or ncar
weekends and on nights when the weather was clear.
Their tracking disclosed that when "Chevron's" groups
came within 50 to 75 yards of Highway 86, they turned right
and walked eastward, parallel to the road. Then. approximately at highway milepost 122, the tracks would turn north
and disappear at the road. From this pattern. the officers
concluded that the aliens very likely 'wre picked up by a vehicle-probably one approaching from the east, for after a
long overland march the group was most likely to walk parallel
to the highway toward the approaching vehiclr. The officers
also concluded that, after the pick-up. the vehicle probably
returned to the east. because it '"as unlikely that thr group
would be walking away from its ultimate destination.
On the Sunday night of January 30- 31. 1977. officers Grny
and Evans, two Borrler Patrolmen '"ho had been pursuing
the investigation of "Chevron." \Yere on duty in the C'asa
Grandr area. The latest set of observed "Chevron" tracks
had been made on Saturday, January 15-16. January 30- 31
"·as the first clear night after three clays of rain. For these
rra.sons. Gray and Evans decided there was a strong possibility that "Chevron" would leacl aliens from the border to
the highway that night.
The officers assumed that. if "Chevron" did conduct a group
that night, he would not leave Mexico until after dark. that
iR. about 6 p.m. They knc'" from their experience that
groups of this sort, travelling on foot. cover about two and a
half to three miles an honr. Thus. the 30-mile journey would
take from 8 to 12 hours. From this. the officers calculntf'Cl
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that "Chenon" and his group would arrive at Highway 86
somewhere between 2 a. m. and 6 a. m. on January 31.
About 1 a. m .. Gray and Evans parked their patrol car on
an elevated location about one hundred feet off Highway RG
at milepost 149, a point some 27 miles cast of milepost 122.
From their vantage point, they could see passing vehicles by
the moonlight. They estimated that it \YOuld take approximately one hour and a half for a vehicle to make a round trip
from their vantage point to milepost 122. Working on the
hypothesis that the pick-up vehicle approached milepost 122
from the east and thereafter returned to its starting point.
they focused upon vehicles that passed them from the east
and. after about one hour and a half, passed them returning
to the east.
Because "Chevron" appeared to lead groups of between 8
and 20 aliens at a time. the officers deduced that the pick-up
vehicle would be one that was capable of carrying that a large
group without arousing suspicion. For this reason. and bccanse they knew that certain types of vehicles "·ere commonly
used for smuggling sizable groups of aliens. they decided to
limit their attention to vans. pick-up trucks. small trucks.
campers, motor homes. and other similar vehicles.
Traffic on Highway 86 at milepost 149 was normal for the
time of day of the officers' surveillance. In the five-hour
1)eriod between 1 a. m. and 6 a. m., 15 to 20 vehic1cs passed
the officers heading west. toward milepost 122. Only tiro of
thcm.-both pick-up trucks with camper shells-were of the
kind that the officers had concluded "Chevron" " ·ould likely
use if he was to carry aliens that night. One. a distinctively
colorrd pick-up truck with a camper shell, passed for the first
time at 4:30 a. m. Agent Gray was able to sec and record
only a partial licc'l1se number. "GN 88-." 1 At 6:12 a. m ..
almost exactly the estimated one hour and a half later. a
Tho second camper p:t>'sod thrm 15 or 20 minutr:; Inter.
thr record shows, it did not. return.
1
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vehicle looking like this same pick-up passed them again. this
time heading east.
The officers follo,ved the pick-up and were satisfied from
its license plate, "GN 8804." that it \vas the same vehicle
that had passed at 4:30 a. m. At that point, they flashed
their police lights and intercepted the vehicle. Respondent
Jesus Cortez was the driver and owner of the pick-up; respondent Pedro Hernanclez-Lorea was sitting in the passenger's seat. Hernandez-Lorea \YaS wearing shoes with soles
matching the distinctive "chevron" shoeprint.
The officers iclen tified themselves and told Cortez they were
conducting an immigration check. They asked if he ''"as
carrying any passengers in the camper. Cortez told them
he had picked up some hitchhikers, and he proceeded to open
the back of the camper. In the camper, there were six illegal
aliens. The officers then arrested the respondents.
Cortez and Hernanclez-Lorea were charged ;vith six counts
of transporting illegal aliens in violation of 8 U. S. C. ~ 1324
(a). By pretrial motion, they sought to suppress the e\·iclence obtained by Officers Gray and Evans as a result of
stopping their vehicle. They argued that the officers did not
have adequate cause to make the investigative stop. The
District Court denied the motion. A jury found the respondents guilty as charged. They were sentenced to concurrent
prison terms of five years on each of six counts. In addition.
Hernanclez-Lorea was fined $12.000.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for tlw Kin th Circuit reversed, holding that the officers lacked a sufficient basis
to justify the stop of the pick-up. 595 F. 2d 505 (1979).
That court recognized that United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U. S. 873 (1975). provides a standard governing investigative stops of the kind involved in this case, stating:
"The quantum of cause necessary in ... cases flike
this one] was established in United States v. BrignoniPonce. '[Olfficers on roving patrol may stop vehicles
only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, to-
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gcthcr with rational inferences from those facts, that
reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain
aliens who may be illegally in the country.' " 595 F. 2d)
at 507 (quoting Um'ted Stales v. Brignoni-Ponce, supm,
at 884) (citations omitted).
The court also recognized that "the ultimate question on ap]X'al is whether the trial judge's finding that founded suspicion
was present here was clearly erroneous." Ibid. Here, because, in the vie\v of the facts of the two judges constituting
the majority, "rtlhe officers did not have a valid basis for
singling out the Cortez vehicle," id., at 508, and because the
circumstances admitted "far too many innocent inferences to
make the officers' suspicions reasonably warrantrd," ibid.,
the panel concluded that the stop of Cortez' vehicle lvas a violation of the respondents' rights under the Fourth Amendment. In dissent. Judge Chambers was persuaded that
Brignoni-Ponce recognized the validity of permitting an officrr to assess the facts in light of his past experience.
II
A

The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person.
including brief investigatory stops such as the stop of the
vehicle here. Reid v. Georgia, U. S. - , (1980);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S .. supra, at 878;
Davis v. Mississipp1:, 394 U. S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S. 1, 16-19 (1968). An investigatory stop must be
.i ustified by some objective manifestation that the person
stopped is. or is about to be. engaged in criminal activity.
Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 51 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U. S. 648, 661 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
supra, at 884; A dams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146-149
(1972); Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 16-19.
Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive
concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop

l
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a person. Terms like "probable cause" and "articulable rca- sons" or "founded suspicion' are not self-defining; they fall
short of providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad
factual situations that arise. But the essence of all that has
hPen written is that the totality of the circumstances--the
"·hole picture-must be taken into account. Based upon that
whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity. See. e. g., Brown v. Texas, .
supra, at 51; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 884.
The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must
yield a particularized suspicion contains two elements. each
of which must be present before a stop is permissible. First.
the assessment must be based upon all of the circumstances ..
The analysis proceeds with various objective observations.
information from police rf'ports. if such are available and
consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these data. a trained officer·
draws inferences and makes deductions-inferences and deductions that might well <:'lude an untrained person.
The process does not deal with hard certainties. but with
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulatf'd as such. practical people formulated certain commonS<'nse conclusions about human behavior; .i urors as factfinders
are permitted to do th<' same-and so are law enforcement
officers. Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and
"·eighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars. but as
understood by thosr versed in the field of law enforcement.
The secm1d element contained in the idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particulariz<'cl suspicion is the concept that the process just describ<'cl must
rais<' a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped
is engaged in "Tongdoing. C'hid Justic<' Warren. speaking
for the Court in Terry v. Ohio, s~tpra, said. "[tlhis demand
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for specificity in the information upon which police action is
predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence." Id., at 21 , n. 18 (emphasis
added. See also, Brown v. Texas, supra, at 51; Delaware v.
Prouse, supra, at 661-663; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,.
supra, at 884.
B
This case portrays at once both the enormous difficulties of
patrolling a 2,000-mile open border and the patient skills
needed by those charged with halting illegal entry into this
country. It implicates all of the principles just discussedespecially the imperative of recognizing that. when used by
trained law enforcement officers. objectives facts. meaningless
to the untrained, can be combined with permissible deductions
from such facts to form a legitimate basis for suspicion of a
particular person-and action on that suspicion. We seE:"
here the kind of police work often suggested by judges and
scholars as examples of appropriate and reasonable means of
law enforcement. Here. fact on fact and clue on clue afforded a basis for the deductions and infPrcnces that brought
the officers to focus on "Chevron."
Of critical importance. the agents knew that the area was
a crossing point for illegal alirns. They knew that it was
common practice for persons to lead aliens through the desert
from the border to Highway 86. where they could-by prearrangement--be picked up by a vehicle. Moreover. based
upon clues they had discovered in the two-month period
prior to the events at issue herr. they brlirved that one such
guide. whom they designated "C'hrvron." had a particular
pattern of operations.
By piecing together the information at their disposal, thr
officers tentatively concluded that there was a reasonable
likelihood that "Chevron" 'vould attPmpt to lead a group of
aliens on the night of Sunday. January 30-31. Somconr with
chevron-soled shoes had led sevrral groups of aliens in the·
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]'JJ"'C"vious two monthsJ yet it hacl been two weeks since the
latest crossing. "Chevron.'' they deduced, was therefore due
reasonably soon. "Chevron" tended to travel on clear weekend nights. Because it had rained on the Friday and Satur'(lay nights of the weekend involved here, Sunday was the
only clear night of that weekend; the officers surmised it
IYa~ therefore a likely night for a trip.
Once they had focused on that night, the officers drew upon
other objective facts known to them to deduce a time frame
1vithin which "Chevron" and the aliens were likely to arrive.
From what they knew of the practice of those who smuggle
aliens, including what they kne'v of "Chevron's" previous activities. they deduced that the border crossing and journey
through the desert would probably be at night. They knew
th0 time when sunset would occur at the point of the border
crossing; they knew about how long the trip lvould take.
They were thus able to deduce that "Chevron" \Yould likely
arrive at the pick-up point on Highway 86 in the time frame
between 2 a. m. and 6 a. m.
From objective facts, the officers also deduced the probable
point on the highway-milepost 122-at which "Chevron"
would likely rendezvous with a pick-up vehicle milepost 122.
They deduced from the direction taken by the sets of "Chevron" footprints they had earlier discovered that the pick-up
vehicle would approach the aliens from, and return ''"ith
them to, a point east of milepost 122. They therefore staked
out a position east of milepost 122 (at milepost 149) ancl
watched for vehicles that passed them going west and then,
approximately one and a half hours later, passed them again,
this time going east.
From what they had observed about the previous groups
guided by the person with chevron shoes, they deduced that
"Chevron" would lead a group of 8 to 20 aliens. They therefore focu eel their attention on enclosed vehicles of that
passenger capacity.
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The analysis produced by officers Gray and Evans can be
summarized as follows: if, on the night upon ·which they
believed "Chevron" was likely to travel. sometime between
2 a. m. and 6 a. m .. a large enclosed vehicle was seen to make
a east-west-east round trip to and from a deserted point
(milepost 122) on a deserted road (High"'·ay 86 )) the officers
would stop the vehicle 011 the return trip. In four-hour
prriod the agents observed only one vehicle meeting thn.t
description. And is it not surprising that7 when they stopped
the vehicle on its rC'turn trip it contained "Chevron" and
several illegal aliens.~

c
The limited purpose of the stop in this case was to question
the occupants of the vehicle about their citizenship and
immigration status and the reasons for the round trip in a
short time span in a virtually deserter! area. No search of
the camper or any of its occupants occurred until after respondent Cortez voluntarily opened the back door of the
cam perf ; thus, only the stop. not the search is at issue here.
There intrusion upon privacy associated with this stop was
limited and was "reasonably related in scope to the justification for [its] initiation." Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 29.
We have recently held that stops by the Border Patrol may
be justified under circumstances less than those constituting
probable cause for arrest or search. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 880. In no other way can there be any
meaningful control over the illegal entry of aliens. Thus,
~In Brignoni-Poncr. supm, at &'l4-885, the Court li&1ed seYernl farton,
io he con10idered a~ part of the totality of ihe circumstances in determining
thr existence vel nou of a particularized su~picion in cases treating official
attempts to stem the infl11x of illrgal aliens into our country. Though the
li~t did not purport to be rxhau~ti\'l', it i' notrworthy that several of thr
factors present here were recognized by Brignoni-Ponce as significant in
thi:< context; for examplr, information about rrrent bordrr cros~ings nne!
thr t~·pe of vehicle invoh·ecl .

.,

79-404----0PINION
10

UNITED STATES v. CORTEZ

the test is not whether officers Gray and Evans had probable·
cause to conclude that the vehicle they stopped would contain "Chevron" and a group of illegal aliens. Rather the
question is whether, based upon the whole picture, they, as
experienced Border Patrol agents, could reasonably surmise
that the particular vehicle they stopped was engaged in criminal activity. On this record, they could so conclude.
Reversed ..
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 9, 1981
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 80-404 Prince Edward School Foundation v.
United States

While I think that the question of whether the regulation ,
of the IRS is ''fairly subsumed" within the questions presented,
see Pet. inside cover, in order to avoid the possibility that
a majority of us would conclude after argument that it was
not, or that the argument on it was not sufficiently targeted,
I suggest that in addition to the order granting certiorari
the following language be appended:
"The parties are requested to brief, in
addition to any other issues they desire,
the following question:
'Does §50l(c) (3) authorize the
Internal Revenue Service to deny
tax-exempt status to a private
school which discriminates in its
admissions policy?'"
Sincerely,

f;1d~

.§u.prnm ~ourl of ±qr 'J!lnili?t .§h:tftg
~asfrington,

Jl.

~· 20gtJI>~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

January 12, 1981 ~

Re:

79-404

United

States

Cortez, etc

Dear Chief,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

,.

''

v.

.._)
~u.prtutt

Qfmttt of tqt ~nitt~ ~fattg
,ht.afti:ngton:. ~. QJ. 20.;1)!.~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 79-404 - United States v. Cortez

Dear Chief:
Please join me.

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

January 12; 1981

January 12, 1981

No. 79-404

u. s.

v. Cortez

Dear Chief:
I have written you a separate join note.
In reading your description of the cause required
to justify an investigative stop, you state that such a stop
•must be justified by some objective manifestation that the
person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal
activity."
I have thought that an officer also may stop a
person for questioning if he has reasonable grounds for
believing the individual is wanted for alleged criminal
conduct in the past. Do you think it is desirable to add a
footnote to this effect?
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

LFP/lab

January 12, 1981

No. 79-404

u. s.

v. Cortez

Dear Chief:
Please join me.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

LFP/lab

Copies to the Conference

•

~u.prttttt

<!fltllrl of t!rt ~b ~taftg

Jfaglfinghm. ~. <!f.

2llgt'!-~

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

RE:

January 12, 1981

79-404 -

u.s.

v. Cortez

Dear Lewis:
To be on the "safe" side I will add a footnote
"Of course an officer may stop and
question a person if there is
reasonable grounds to believe that
person is wanted for past criminal
conduct".

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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C H AMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . R E HNQUIST

January 13, 1981
Re:

No. 79-404

United States v. Cortez

Dear Chief:
Ple ase join me in your opinion for the Court.

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

--

o.,:-•

•.

~uprtnu

<!foutt of t4t ~nittb ~tatts
1lhudrmgton. ~. <!f. 21lbf't~

CHAMBERS 01'"

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

January 13, 1981

Re:

No. 79-404 - U.S. v. Cortez

Dear Chief:
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,

-j.!#.
T.M.

The Chief Justice
cc:

·The Conference

.§uptmu C!Jvurlvf firr 'Jliniitlt ~taft.s
~Uftin.gt014l\1. (IJ. 2.06t~~
CHAM BE R S OF

.J U S TI C E

w ... .

January 16, 1981

.J . B R E NNAN, JR.

RE:

No. 79 - 404

United States v. Cortez

Dear Chief:
I agree.
Sincerely,

~
The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

..

.§u.p-rtmt <!fonri of t!tt ~b ~tatts
~rurfri:ngton. ~· <!f. 21l~J.l.~
CHAMBERS OF"

January 16, 198

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

RE:

79-404 - United States v. Cortez

Dear Thurgood:
Now that Bill Brennan has joined there will be no
dissent unless you do ~~All are now in.
down next Wednesday.

Should you join this case can come
Regards,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 14, 1981

Re:

79-404 - United States v. Cortez

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

)-1__

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

v
January 19, 1981

Re:

No. 79-404 - United States v. Cortez

Dear Chief:
Please add to the bottom of your opinion
that I concur in the judgment.
Sincerely,

~T.M.

The Chief Justice
cc:

• .I

The Conference
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